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44 Lumv. CALIF. WATER & TEL. CO. [21 C.2d 
has rendered, less the value of what he has received, unless 
what he' bas rendered can be and is returned to him in specie 
within a reasonable time ...• " 
Applying these rules to the facts shown in the present ac-
tion, upon any failure of the company to perform the con-
tract cimsed by the supervention of public regulation, justice 
requires that it must compensate the appellant in the amouIit 
of the value of the rIparian right taken from his predecessor 
in interest, together with the value of the easement for the 
maintenance of the water main until it was abandoned., .AB 
a credit upon such amounts; the appellant' must· be charged 
for the value of the benefits received by Lake and his suc-
cessors in interest. 
[6] The finding of the trial court, fully justified by the 
record, that there is insufficient evidence from which it could 
find that the· consideration for the Lake contract was ade-
quate forecloses the appellant from sccuring the remedy of 
specific performance. 'I.'he declaration of section 3391 of the 
Civil Code that "Specific performance cannot be enfbrced 
Ilgainst a party . . • if he has not received an adequate cori~ 
sideration for the contract,." makes adequacy of. considera-
tiona prerequisite to the granting o:fsucli relief: (Corn.bUlh 
v; Valentine, 21I Cal. 243 [294P. 1065] ;,O'Oonnell v. Lampe, 
206 Cal, 282 [274 P. 336]; O'Hara v; Watts on, 172 Cal. 525 
[157 P. 608]; Haddoekv~. Knapp~ 171C~1. ~9 [151 P. 114,0); 
Morrison v; Land, 169.Cal. 580 [1471\ 25~1; Wilst.l1a v; 
White, 161 CaL 453 [f19 P. 895J;. Nottenv. Mensing, 20 Cal. 
App.2d 694 [67 P.2d 734] ; Kels6yV.San: 1J'~tnar/,do Develop~ 
ment 00., {ne., 124 Cal. App; 279'[12r:2g. 70];) 
[7]. Nor is .the appella:!].t entitl~dtoi:i::tjunctiverelief. The 
record discloses no, evidence. tliat· theresporident has refused 
to deliver water to theappelIant hut onlytha(it,insists upon' 
the payment of.a high!3r'rate thanthatpr~escribe<l by the COn~ 
tract. Until the contract rat.e is anntilledby the' Railroad 
Commission, the appellant may secure ad¢quate. compensation 
for the failure of the respondent to perform its obligations 
under the contract by an action for damages. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Traynor, J., andPeters~ 
J. pro tem., concurred. 
Carter, J., concurred In the judgment. 
'" , 
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. [L. A. No. 18302. In Bank. Oct. 2,1942.] 
STATE OF OHIO exrel. S. Ii. SQUIRE, Superintendent of 
Banlrs, etc., Respondent, v. CLARENCE H. PORTER, 
Appellant. . 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] 
Limitation of Actions-Law Governing . .,,;.;,The statute' of limi-
tations of the forum governs the, tinlefor the commencement 
of an action arising- in another state. 
Banks-Stockholdcrs-Liability---Limltation.--A. bank stock ... 
holder's liabiHty for his proportionate share of'cbrPorate debts 
is a liability creat~d by law within Code Civ. Proc.,§ 359. 
Corporations-Stockholders' Liability-Law Governing.-The . 
full faith and credit clausl3 (U.S.Const., art. IV,§ 1) requires 
that the time when a stockholder's lill.bilitywas created, within . 
Code Civ. Proc., § 359, be dctel'Dlinedbythe law of the state' 
of the corporation's domicile. ',. 
Banks-Stockholders-Liability-Limitation.--Thellabilityof .. 
a stockholder of a bank under tho Ohio law is' creatlld ¥thin 
Code Civ.Proc., § 359, prcsCJ;ibing 'th~ ·time-for ~t, o~ 'the 
dI!.Y.the. barikfails; nO,t the day ··.the·S.'upermtendent .0f)~~I!· 
take.s possessIon, since the creditors can enforce the J.iabilitfo~ 
failtlre of the bank, and the statute givlng. th,e' superintendESn,t' 
exclusive authority in.this respcrit fronl:..thetimc· he tli.k~s:p'~s4 
session (Ohio Gen. Code, 710-95) does' -ti~t'sttbstit1ite 8!1i;:ew 
liability. . . - "";'.' ...... ".;;lJ):,.:r 
Id.-,Stockholders-LiabUitY-Limitati()¥~:A.nf; ~~tion} t~'~n¥ 
force Ii. bank stoc~oldlir'ssuperndiled'lit1~ility'~iie¥~:bh1o" 
Const., art. XIII, §3, is nota '.suit.ou·an'·as'ScssnrentFonff-ltfJ . 
enforce a liability that is direct, priniary .atldso~~e:xe'clil,t¥g •. 
And to give effect to the 'Ohio lawdti· (tpplYing the: limita~' 
period proscribed in Code CIv.l?roc.;§359;i~.no:ta Violation " 
, ()f the privileges and immunity' elnuse of the .• U.S: COllstk(art 
,IV,§ :a), although liability undcrthe.Cali~o~ ~~~!;~to~~~ , 
!Lolder~' Liability Act (Stat!l.1931,p.3a8-,Deerin~s.(lc~.~a~1 
.19a7, Act 65~a) is regarded all (lrea.todwhen the ;ass~sflln~nfis . 
,nls.de. C?de piv. ~ro<l., § 3.59? is .a,PPIle~ .. t,m,if~~yt9 ~o'Jnp'~i~ 
. the apphcable perIod of lUttltatloti f.Ol' the ;eommenc!'ement' bf 
the actiotl from the cre.ation 'of ihe lili.bility; i ; '.' ;UT: 
..... ' . '1' .::, '(.!tn 
. '! ", "0, .:tn 
[1], See 160al. Jur.411; 11 Ani. Jur. 50~. .' ., ' '. ";,, 
Mc:K.Dig.lteferences: [1] Lunitation of Actions;§ 16; [2,4,:5] 
Bl!.nks,§ 44; [3] Corporations, § 494. 
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46 STATE OF Omo EX REL.SQUlRE v. PORTER [21 C.~d 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Reversed; 
Action to enforce supcradded liability of stockholder of ll.n, 
Ohio bank. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. 
Meserve, Mumper & Hughes, Roy L. Herndon and Charles 
O. Parker for Appel1.1nt. 
Mathes & Sheppard, GordonF. Hampton, Einrys Davis, 
Wm. C. Mathe-'l, Thomas J. Herbert, Attorney General 
(Ohio), E. S. Lindemann, Special, Counsel to Attorney' Gen~ 
eral, E. J. Halambeck, Assistant Special Counsel to Attorney 
General, and Paul M. Gregg for Respondent . 
SHENK, J.:......The State of Ohio, on the relation ofS. H. 
Squire, Superintendent of Banks in charge of liquidation of 
The Union Trust Company of Cleveland,commenced, this 
action on May 26, 1936, in Los Angeles County, to enforce 
an alleged stockholders' liability against' the defendant. In 
his answer the defendant raised the point that the cause of 
action was barred by the provisions of section 359 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure. The case W8B tried on 
stipulated fact'l, jUdgment was for plaintiff, and the defen-
dant appealed. ' 
The Union Trust Company was a banking corporation. It 
was organized and existed under the corporation and hank-
ing laws of the State of Ohio. On February 27, 1933,. and 
for some time prior thereto, the defendant was a stockholder 
owning 560 shares of capital stock of the company, having a 
par value of $25 per share. On the morning of that day, 
the company was unable to mect its obligations in the reg-
ular course of business. Pursuant to a resolution of its 
board of directors, but without statutory authority, it oper-
ated all that day on a so-called restricted bnsis in that it 
refused to payout on demand more than 5 per cent of any 
demand deposit or other matured obligation. On the eve-
ning of that day, the Ohio Legislature enacted a law, effective 
immediately, authorizing the Superintendcnt of Banks to place 
any banking institution on a restricted basis and to segregate 
all deposits thereafter received. .Accordingly, the superin-
tendent made such an order applicable to The Union Trust 
Company. On April 8, 1933, the superintendent appointed a 
conservator to take possession of the business and property 
Oct. 1942] STATE OF OHIO EX REL. SQUIRE 'V. PORTER 
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of the bank~ The conservator' was in. posseSsion and con~~Rl 
frotn that date until June 15, 1933, when . the superintendent 
deel:tre~and determin~d. that thecotnpany ,wa~in, ari"~~ , 
sound and unsnfe condItIOn. He thereupon to~kp.os~es.s~()ll: ' 
for the purpose of liquidation. On July 30,1~3~" the, s~~~t~ 
intendant,after aUditing the affairs of the bari¥; .foUnd'rtli~t 
the liabilities exeeeded the nssets in an amounfgreater "iliaD: 
the stockholders' !'io-called superadded or , do,lble. liabilitY,. 
On .August 1, 1934, the superintendent, caused notices' i&' be 
mailed to the stockholders; advising them that the ;rissets' weJ,'e 
insufficient to dischar~e theliubilitiesnnd that:' h!l" intende4 
to enforce the individual liability of the stockholders. H'e 
advised each, stockholder of the amount' (lOOper, ~ent :assess~ 
ment)nnd demanded payment on or before November 1) 1934: 
, [1] It is well nettled that the, statute, of limitations of 
the forum ~overllS the time for the commencement of an 
action arising in another state. (McElmoyle, :v~ Ooken, ~13 
Pet. 312 [10 L.Ed. 177]; Great Western Telegraph Co. v, 
Purdy, 162 U.S. 329 [16 S.Ot. 810, 40L.Ed. ,986]; Royal 
Trust Co. v. MacBean, 168 Cal. 642 [144 P. i39].) 
[2] AP. applied to the present controversy,section 359·of 
the Cali~<?rnia Coue of Civil Procedure provides that an ac;.' 
tion against a stockholder to enforce a liability' created by law 
"must be brought within three years after ,~", . the liability 
was created." The stockholder's liability for his proportion-
ate share of the corporate indebtedness is 'a . "liability cre-
ated by law" within the mcaningof this section. ' (Hunt v. 
Ward, 99 Cal. 612 [34 P. 335, 37 Am.St.Rep. 87] ;' Richard-
sOn v. Craig, 11 Cal.2d 131 [77 P.2d 1077].) The:time when 
the liability was created must be differentiated from the tiine 
when the cause of action necrued; [3] To determine· when 
the liability was created the full faith and, credit clause of 
the United States Constitution (art. IV, § 1) 'requires re-
course to the applicable constitutional provisions,'statutes and 
decisions of Ohio. (Converse v. Hamilton,. 224 U.S. 234 [32 
s.Ot. 415, 56 L.Ed. 749].) . 
[4] The stockholders' superadded or double.liability'w8B 
imposed by article XIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, 
which provided that "stockholders of corporations authorized' 
to receive money on deposit shall be held individually r('spon-
sible, equally and ratably, and not one foranothe'r, for all 
contracts, debts, and engagements of such corporations, to 
the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par 
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48 STA'I'E OF Omo EX nEL. SQUInE V. PORTER [21 C.2d 
vallie thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such 
shares. " The liability WDS direct and self-executing, did' not 
need legislation to make it ei'ft?cth'e, and created a primary 
obligation against the stockhulder by operation of law. 
(Squire v. Standen, 135 Ohio Bt. 1 [18 N~E.2d608, 120 A.L.R. 
952] ; State v. Bremer, 130 OIlioSt. 227 [19S ~.E.87:4] ; ~ni~ 
der v. United Banking & Trust OO'Y/i,pany, 124 Ohio St. a75 
[178 N.E. 840];' I-ang v. Osborn Bank, 100 Ohio St. 51 [125 
N.E. 105].) However, the Ohio Le~islature saw fit to enact 
section 710-75 of the General Code ·of that statc. On Feb" 
mary 27, 1933,when The Union Trust Company suspended 
business, said section provided as follows: 
"Stockholders of banks shall be held individually respon-
sible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all 
contracts, debts, and engagements of such bank, to the ~xtent 
of the amount ,of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, 
in addition to the amount invested in such shares. The stock-
holders in any bank who shall have transferred their shares 
or registered the transfer thereof within sixty days neXt be-
fore the failure of such bank to mect its obligations, or with 
knowledge of such impending failure, shall be liable to the 
same extent as if they had madc no such transfer,. to the ex-
tent that the transferee fails to meet'such liability; ... At 
any time after taking possession of a bank for the purpose 
of liquidation, when the superintendcnt of banks ascertains 
that the assets of such bank will be insufficient to pay its 
debts and liabilities, he may enforce the individual liability 
of the stockholders." ' 
And on March 31, 1933, section 710-95 of the Ohio Gen-
eral Code wMamended to .read as follows: 
"The superintendent of· banks, upon taking possession of 
the business and property of any bank, shall have, exercise 
and discharge the following powers, authority ,and duties, 
without notice or approval of court, but subject t6the pro-
visions of ,this chapter,towit: ... 
"9. If he ascertains that the Msets of such bank will be 
insufficient to pay its debts and ,liabilities, to' enforce, the in. 
dividualliability of ,each sh:lreholder there6f'asp~ovidcd in 
section 710-75 'of the General Code'.UntlIah order to de-
clare and pay a final diVidend)hall b(!' entcred in the liqui-
dation prbceedings the'l1ght to.enfo,rce stich iiability is hereby 
vested exclilShrely in the 8uperirttcndent Of banks." ' " 
The obviouS effect oIthisa.m~dincnt waS to lodge in the 
superinterideIit of banks the exclusive authority to enforce 
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the stockholders' liability in cases where he, had taken p~~ 
'sessio;nof a bnnk fOl'the purpose of liquidation. (Fulton V. 
WetzeZ, 47 Ohio App. 72 [190N.E.77,6]; lf~Zdmanv. Stan~ 
dard ,Trust Bank, 46 Ohio 1,\pp. 67 '[187 N.Ft~ ,743].) And 
unde~ its provisions the SUperintendent ,could not l>rillg ,an 
actiQIl to enforce the stockholders' liability UntU he had taken 
possess!on :for the purpose or'liquidation. ','(SnUer v.' United 
Banking and Trust 00" supra.) It i!!i the law of OhiQthat 
when the superintendent of bankssrie~ toenfprce the' ~stbck'­
holders' liability he represents the creditors (Feid.ma,n \1; 
Standard Trust' Bank, supra), and that any statute Of'IJDl,i-
tations which would bar an action by the creditor wou],d like-
wise bar an action brought by the superintendent of' banks 
to enforce the ~uperadded liability. (State v. Bremer, supra.) 
February 27, 1933, the day the bank failed to meet its 
obligations in the ordinary course of business and limited 
its paynlents to 5 per cent of any demand deposit or matured 
obligatiori, marked the beginning of voluntary liquidation. 
A cause of action was immediately created and acci'rued t() 
th~ crcditors. At that time the superintendent of banks had 
not taken possession for the purpose of liquidation, and his 
action in that respect was the all-Important conditioli prece-
dent to the enforcement of thestQckholders' liability. (Sni(ler 
v~ 'United Banking & Trust Qompdny, supra.)H~ did not 
take possession until June 15,1933. Dux:i;ng th~p~riod ,from 
February 27 to June 15, ~933,the cr~,4i~ors,cq1ild.h~ve:en­
forced the ,stockholders' liability .. (Snid~r:t. ;TJnitl!d' Ban~ing 
& Trust Oompany,supra.)" Inasmttcha;s,the right o~ the 
creditors to 'enforce that liability ha,daccl:'11~c:i, ~s ~a,rly as 
February 27, 1933; the liabilityuponwh,icp:the Pl'i!$~lit~¢ti~n 
was based certainly WM created at least as El"a.tJy, 'as ,th~ 'q,ate 
the calise of. 'action aC!lrued. When on, if~~:'1.I): J~af,~he 
superintendent tookposse~sio:p,of. t,he~a~~9rth.,n)iiqJose 
of liquidation, the provisions 6fsectioll,7~O-9.5.' gi:yjD:g'the 
superintendent the exclusiveright~9' ,ehfor~.'tli~Ua,bfliiY ' 
became operative ,and automaii!lally ,abf1ted,~ny ; rig~t, ~e~e1 ' 
t~forepossessed by thecreditoi'siQ;Cllf9r~., ~cll:U,abmtt, 
including actjons pendingwhcn the~en,dmen;t to, $~tion 
710-95 became effective. (FuZion v"Wetz~Z, ;47 Ohio' .A.pp; 
72 [190 N. E. 776].)' ' 
The statute giving thesuperinte'ndent,Qf banks the ex~ 
elusive authority after takin/t possessit!h to enfo!'c.e, the stock-
holders' liability did not substitu:t~ a new or diffel"elit liabil-
r 
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50 STATE OF' Omn EX RET,. SQUIRE V. PORTER [21 C.2d 
:ity from that already existing, that is, it did not "uncreate" 
an already created liability. The statute merely substituted 
the superintendent of banks in place of the creditors in the 
t'Iiforcement of the stockholrlers' liability. It is the settled 
law of Ohio that the provisions of the General Code Ilections 
inthis r~spect w(;re procedural and not substantive. (Snider 
v.United Banking & Tru.st Oompany, supra; Squirv v. Bor.-
ton!i7 Borton (Solinski), 132 Ohio St. 180 [5 N.E.2d 479].) 
Furthermore, the primary, direct and self-executing stockhold_ 
ers' Hability declared in thf' Ohio Constitution could not be 
changcd by a proc~dural provision relating to the method 
of. its enforcement. 
Additional support is found in the decisions of Ohio for 
the conclusion that the stockholders' liability was createn the 
day the bank failed, namely, on February 27, 1933. In 
Squire v. Harrls, 135 Ohio St. 449 [21 N.E.~d 463], a trans-
feree of hank stock was held not subject to the superadded 
liability where the transfer in question took place on the 
same day but after tht' bank had ceased to receive money on 
genqral df'posit. Also, it has been hdd that the 60-day period 
preceding failure, prescribed in Ohio General Coue, section 
710-75, during- which a transferor of bank stock remained 
hable as surety for thf' transfrrf'e's liability, relat.t:d hack 
t "om the day the bank fail ('d, and not from the nny the su-
I lrint<'l'ldent of banks took posscssion. (Bailey v. St/#e, 
lUrt of ApPf'als, Ohio, Cuyahogoa County, (Ohio App.) 32 E.2d 453.) 
[5] The plaintiff contends that the suit is on the .. assess-
ment"; that the "assessment" is It "publie act" within the 
scope of. artic·le IV, section 1 of the federal Constitution and 
must be accorded full f[lith and credit by thu courts of Cali-
fornia; that !;line" the Ollio law and the National Bank Act 
(U.S.C.A., title 12, § 21 et seq.) are similar, the deClslOns IlJ-
volving the Natiollal Bank Act to the effect that the suit is on 
the" assessment" are controlling; that such result is in accord 
with Richardson v. Oraig, 11 Ca1.2d 131 [77 P.2d 1077), which 
holds that the liability is created at the time of the aR.Re!'s-
ment; and that to give a different interpretation of the Oldo 
law would be to violate article IV, scction 2 of the United 
States Constitution, providin!!' that the· citizens of each state 
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. 
The case of State v. Melaragno, 31 O.L.R. 627 (Court of 
Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 1930), does Dot support the 
Oct. 1942] STATE OF OHIO EX REL. SQumE v. PORTER 
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plaintiff's position that the present action must be deemed 
to be on the assessment. In that case the court was applying 
a statute of limitations which prescribed a .per~od c!>mmenc-
in~ from the time the cause of action accrued, as distinguished 
from the time the liability was created. Furtllermore"the 
reasoning of that decision to the effect that the,liability, did 
not accrue until thB assets of thebllllk we~e.,liquidl1:tedis 
contlary to the established and admitted holdfng,ofthe Ohi9 
Supreme Court that the stockholders' liability is 'direct,! pJ,'i~ 
mary and self-executing. It may be notedthat,itisnotne~.­
essary in an action by the superintendent of banks iIi Ohio 
to enforce the stockholders' liability that he even,allege that. 
he has declared an assessment. . . 
Other cases cited by the plaintiff do not support his p08i~ 
tion. They include: Squire V. Standen, supra; State v. Mur~ 
fey, Blossom &7 00., 131 Ohio St. 289 [2 N.E.2d 866] ; Vance 
V. Warner, 129 Ohio St. 357 [195 N.E. 704]; State v. Oruik~. 
shank, 51 Ohio App. 61 [199 N.E. 611]; Barumgardner v. 
State, 48 Ohio App. 5 [192 N.E. 349]. In those cases the 
courts of Ohio recognized that the liability which was en-
forced by' an assessment was the direct and p1,'imary. stock-
holders' liability, even though the necessity therefor and the 
amount thereof be. determined exclusively and finally by the 
fact and the amount of the assessment. , , 
The plaintiff's citation of numerous authorfiXes constru-
ing the National Bank Act and other actS similar.to the Ohio 
statute is unavailing for the reason that we arc here boun,d 
by the Ohio court's interpretation of the prOVIsions of the 
Constitution and statutes of that state. 
In the case of Richardson V. Oraig,l1 Ca1.2d 131 [77 P.2d 
1077], this court held that the liability under tlie California 
Bank Stockholders' Liability Act (Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 
652a) was "created" when the assessment was made. This 
holding could be considered only in the absence of c.onStruc~ 
tion by the courts of Ohio of its own fundamental and stat-
utory laws. As we have seen, the Ohio courts have denom-
inated the stockholders' liability direct, primary and se1£-
f'x~lmting, as distingouished from the indirect and secondary 
stockholders' liability involved in the California decision. 
Although the limitation of section 359 of the California Code 
of Civil Procedure is applied in the same sense in both the 
Hichnrdson case and the present case,namely, from the time 
the liability was created, the different conclusions result froin 
the all-important differences ill substantive law creating the 
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rights Upon which suit Was brought. In. the, Richardson case 
it'",11S recOA'Dized that if the stockholders' liability was. direct 
and primary,as Undcr the earlier California law, the liability 
would havc been created at the time the obligation was ,in-
curreq, and not at the time the aSsessment was levied, 
To give proper effect to the Ohio law in this case obvi~ 
ously i.e; not a' Violation of the privileges ~d immunities 
cla.use of the United States Constitution. The time limita-
tion of said section 359 is applieduni:formly to compute the 
applicable period of limitation for the commencement of the 
action from the time the liability was created. 
We therefore conclude that under the law of Ohio the 
stockholders' liability here sought. to be enforced wascre-
ated on the 27th day of Febru.ary, 1933; and that as the 
action was not· brought within three years after that date 
it is barred by section 359 of our Code of Civil Procedure. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., 
concurred. , 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. Statutes of limitation are pro-
cedural statutes that operate to bar the remedy after a rea-
sonable time for bringing suit upon an accrued cause of 
action has elapsed. They are not intended to alter Or destroy 
the substantive rights or liabilities involved. (See 34 Am,' 
Jur. 15.) When enforcement is sought in the courts of one 
state of a right created under the law of anot!J,er, the law 
of the forum governs matters of procedure, including the 
period of limitation imposed upon the. remedy. (Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws, §§ 603, 604.) InVOking the general 
rule with respect to statutes of limitation, the majority 
opinion relies Upon the provisions of Code Qf Oivil Proce-
dure, section 359, to bar suit Upon a bank stockholder's lia-
bility crell.ted under the laws. of the State of Ohio. 
Section 359, While located in that part of the Code of Civil 
Procedure dealing with statutes of limitation generally,is 
no ordinary stat'llte 6f·lfuiitations. The section requires that 
action..c:; against stockholders to en£orce a ljability created by 
law be bro'llght "withW threc years after . . . the liability 
was created." The threc-year period commences to run from 
the date the liability is created, irre~pective of wh,en the 
cause of action accrues, and the action inight be barred there-
under before any right to sue accrues. (Hunt V.Wa~d, 99 ~, 
Oct. 1942] STATE OF Omo EX'REL. SQUIRE 'IJ. PORTER 
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Ca1.61~ [3.4 P. 33~, 37 Am.St.Rep. 87] ; s¢e: 7 Cal.L;Rev. 346;)' 
Thi"s statute; far from prescrib,iJlg' a reasonable . period. Within, 
which. an accrued caus~ of lictioncan be ei1for.c~dbysuit, 
actually d~1imit$ the '.liabiJity itself. Such . a-st~tu~,.' oper~ 
atihg ·to qualify certain rights· and liabilitiea create,d under 
the laws of ~his state, should not be regarded as a procedural ' 
regulation ,of the forum with respect t9 actions' inVOlving, 
the' enforcement of foreign rights and liabilities. Statutes 
that do nof merely limit the remedy, but qualify' the right, 
are treated as part of the substance of the obligation to be 
determiped according to the law under which the obliga-
tion iscI-eated. (Davis v.Mills, 194 ns. 451 [24'S.Ct. 692, 
48 L.Ed. 1067] ; Osborne v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 87 Vt; 104 
[S8, A. 5).2. Ann.Cas. 19160.' 741 ;¢j. Central Vt. Ry. Co. v;: 
White; 238 US. 507, 511 [35 S.Ct: 865, 59 L:Ed. 1433};- see 
Restaten1:ertt, Conflict of Laws, § 605, comment a:; .34 Am.Jur:. 
16; 28 Yale L.J. 492, 494.) 
Section 359 may be applied for reasons of policy to qual-
ify rights and liabilities arising under the laws of this state. 
W1:ien ~he section was inc~uded in the .Code, of Civil Proce:' 
dure in 1872 the Constitution of California providenthat'each 
shareholder of a corporation was individually and person-
ally liable for his proportion of all 'its debts arld liabilitie.s. 
(Const. of 1849, art. IV, §36.) A similar provision was in .. 
eorporated in the Constitution of 1879. {~ri.XII, § 3.} Thil' 
liability not only worked hardship upon the in-diyidual shar~­
holder, but obstructed the state;s industri1l1 deye1opment. (Si>e 
criticism in Richardson v. Cra1:g, 11' Ca1.2d 131 [77 P.2d 
1077], and in 17 Cal.L.Rev. 276.) It was inevitable that, so 
broad a ~iability should come to be sfrictly' limited. Thus, it 
was held to be" created"- within the mea,n~:Ilgof section" 359 
when the obligation was incurred so that the period of 1imi~ 
tittions .could run and the creditor ooba:rted_,fr:om auini the 
shareholder before his right to SUe, bact ~veli accrued. (H u'7/,~ 
v. Ward~supra.) This interpret;tti<,>n was . reaffirmedihan 
opinion pointing out that reliance thereoll, ha:d b.een an,im. 
portant factor in . the investment. ofmlllions . of' 'donars,)~ 
thi.s state. (Gardiner v. Royer, 167 Ca1.23~. [139 P.15].) 
The hllr$hness of proportional liabillty,,1VaS. m,itigat~d. bY' tl:ii~ 
construction. When the. constituti~~alproVisi.oi1 'impo~~p.g 
t}ils liability wasfihally repealediri .19.30sectio:n>359.~¢I)I!M, 
to be. necesSary as Ii limiting restricti~n upon ··~.··litL~ely 
broad liability, but itS repeal was. ~p~ateht1y'(i~erlo~~ed;_, ' ; 
Whatever the reas6nsof' policy' for the' waf in which IlJec-
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tion 359 has been applied to liabilities created under local 
law, the application of that section to a stockholders' liability 
created under the laws of another state raises major iss~es 
that have been disregarded in the present case as in those 
that have preceded it. Without· It clear perception of the 
distinction between local and foreign liabilities, it has been 
held that section 359 is applicable to the liability of barik 
stockholders imposed by other. jurisdictions. (See Royal Trust 
00. v. lJfacBcan, 168 Cal. 642 [144 P.139J ; Miller v. Lane, 
160 Cal. 90 [116 P. 58J.) The interpretation of section 359 
that starts the period l'l1nning from the time the liability iscr.e~ 
ated rather than when the cause of action accrues, together with 
the holdings, made for other purposes, by courts of sister 
states that their bank stpckholder's liability is a direct 'and 
primary one created at the time the obligation is incnrred, 
results in destroying foreign substantive rights before they 
are ever actually enforceable. 
The Ohio courts have held that under .Ohio law the stock-
holder's ,liability is created at the time the debt is Incurred 
or the deposit is made (State v. Arrowhead Investments, In~., 
10 Ohio Op. 119; Poston v. Httll, 75 Ohio St. 502 [80 N.E. ' 
11J; Brown v. Hitchcock, 36 Ohio St. 667; Squire v. Abbott, 
8 Ohio Op. 134), but this interpretation does not affect the 
statute of limitations in that state, for the action there is 
not barred until six years after the cause of action accrues. 
(National Bank of Lima v. Squire, 3 Ohio Op. 531.) The cause 
of action accrues to the creditor 'when the bankfaiIs to' meet 
its obligations in the ordinary couJ.'se of business (Sqt~ire v. 
Abbott, supra; cf. Brown v. Hitchcock, supra; NationalBank 
of Lima v. Squire, supra); it accrues to the superintendent 
of banks when he determines that the bank is insolvent. 
(National Bank olLima v. Squire, supra; State v. Bremer, 
130 Ohio St. 227 [198 N.E. 8741; State v. Weinberger, 44 
Ohio App. 264 [185 N.E. 432J ; Feldman v. Standard Trust 
Bank, 46 Ohio App. 67 [187 N.E. 743J ; Trustees of Ohio Wes-
leyan University v. State, 50 Ohio App. 51 [197 N.R 612, 
621J). In the present case the Ohio superintendent .of banks 
determined that the bank's condition was unso1lnd and took 
possession for the purpose of liquidation on June 15, 1933. 
On JUly 30, 1934, after aUditing the books of the bank, the 
superintendent found that its liabilities exceeded its assets. 
He mailed notices to this effect to the stockholders on August 
1, 1934, advising them that he intended to enforce their indi-
vidual liability to the extent of a 100 per cent assessment 
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to be paid by November 1, 1934. Under Ohio Inw his canse ' 
of action did not accrue before July 30, 1934, nnd. hIs right 
of action in Ohio was not barred until six years from that 
date. If, however, the deposits sued lIpon were made oi-the 
debts involved were incurred more than three years before 
he determined that the bank was insolvent,the application 
of section 359 wonld cut off the superintendent's rightt(;sue· 
the bank's stockholders in Californiabcfore it aiose and 
would thus operate to destroy a forci!:!D substan.tive right 
before it was ever actually enforceable. Thisre~;uIt is reached 
directly in the case of State of Indiana v. ,Hoffman, 53 Cal; 
App.2d 796 [128 P.2d 162], petition for hearing denied by 
this court, October 1, 1942, holding that the iiabUity of' 
the stockholders is created as soon as the debt is incurred., A' 
similar determination was avoided in the present ,;caseonly 
because the opinion find'! it unnecessary. under the factS-to 
go back farther than the date of the bank's failure, more tlirui . 
three years before suit was filed. '. . . 
California has no policy necessitating' the de~trnction; ;of 
the substantive right of the foreign ban~dep6sitor toeri~. 
force the liability imposed upon the bank's Riockholders,anQ., 
no interest in riding over such rights. In ,fact; its. polici;f;is 
. , .. \ : . '. ' ' ." ·k~ .' 
to impose such liability, for riot only does it have abai:J"k 
act substantially identical with the olJ.i~, statute, but ,thi,~ 
court has held that, the liability under that a~ds notcr~at~a 
until an assessment is made, by the: superintendent of ban'k$'; 
(Richardson v. Oraig, supra; see, al~o, jokn$onv.G,reene;;.SS 
F.21 683, reaching the s~me .concl~sioll; regardit~git:;t~e 
NatIOnal Bank Act, from whIch the CahIormaand OhIo'stat-
utes were copied.) It could not have held otherwise.without 
vitiating the statutory provisionsrelaHng toa~sessments,.for 
an assessment' can rarely be imposed within ihree. Years Of, ,the 
creation of the bank's indebtedness. The majority' ophi.ion~ 
while conceding the right to maintahi actions iIi the courts 
·ofthis state to the California superintendent ofha~ks, de~ 
nies such a right on parallel facts to the Ohlo superintend.eni 
and thus vitiates the Ohio statutory provisions relath;tg to 
assessments. ' 
The opinion ignores the fact that the suits in question 
are brought upon a statutory assessment that' would. be fully 
recognized and enforced in the Ohio courts, (Squire v. St,an-
,den, 135 Ohio St. 1 [18 N.E. 608, 120 A.L.R. 952]; State 
v. Murley, Blossom & 00., 131 OhiQ St, 2$9 [2 N,E.2d 866] ; 
, 
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Vance v. Warner, 129. Ohio St. 357 [195 RE. 704] ; State v. 
Cruikshank,51 Ohio App.61 [199 N.E. 611]; Baumgardner 
v. State, 48 Ohio App. 5 [192 N.R 349]), and thus gives rise 
to an unconstitutional denial of full faith and credit to the 
statutes of Ohio and the assessment levied thereUl;lder. (Brad-
ford Elec. L. Co. v. Olapper, 286 U.S. 145 [52 s.m. 571, 76 
L.Ed. 1026]; Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 [55 S.Ct. 
589, 79 L.Ed. 1100, 100A.L.R 1133] iJohn Hancock jl{utnal 
Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.s. 178 [57 s.m. 129, 81 L.Ed .. 
106] ; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 332, p~ 408; see Lang" 
maid, Fnll Faith and Credit Req1lired for Pnblic Acts, (1924) 
24 Ill.L.Rev. 383.) An assessment of stockholders' lilibi1it~\ 
whether made by court order or by an administrative officer 
pursuant to statutory authority, is a public act to he accorded 
full faith and credit, under the Constitution of the United 
States, in the courts of another state. (Broderick v. Rosner, 
supra; Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 [32 S.Ot. 415, 
56 L.Ed. 749].) The defendant stockholder may set up per-
sonal defenscs (Ohandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 609 [56 S.Ct. 
602, 80 L.Ed. 881]), but once the obligation of the stock-
holders is determined in an assessment proceeding, the exis-
tence and amount of the debt and the proportional liability 
of each are res jndicata and not snbject to collateral attack 
in an action brought in another state to enforce collection 
against a non-resident stockholder. (Selig v. Hamilton, 234 
U.S. 652 [34 S.Ot. 926, 58 L.Ed. 1518]; Marin v. Angedahl, 
247 U.S. 142 [38 S.Ct. 452, 62 L.Ed. 1038] ; Glenn v. Liggett, 
135 U.S. 533 [10 S.Ot. 867, 34 L.Ed. 262] ; see Restatement, 
Conflict of Laws, § 186, comment c; 13 Fletcher, Cyclo-
pedia of the Law of Private Corporations (perm. ed.), § 6522, 
p. 953.) 
It is unconstitutional to impose as a prerequisite of suit a 
condition impossible to fulfill on the pretext of regulating 
procedure. (Broderick v. Rosner, supra; Rankin v. Barton, 
199 U.S. 228 [26 S.Ot. 29, 50 L.Ed. 163]; Lamb v. Powder 
River Live Stock 00., 132 F. 434 [65 C.C.A. 570, 67 L.RA. 
558].) In Broderick v. Rosner, snpra, the New York super-
intendent of banks brought an action in New Jersey to re-
cover on an assessment of the statutory liability of stock-
holders of an insolvent New York bank. The New Jersey 
courts, refusing to allow the action, relied upon the Corpora-
tion Act of New Jersey providing' that no action against any 
stockholder of a· foreign corporation to enforce the statutory 
liability arising under the laws of another state could be 
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brought in the courts of New Jersey unless it 'wasin the 
nature of an equitable accounting· with. all . sto~k~?lders and 
cred itors as necessary parties. The Supreme CClUrt held that 
New .Jersey CQuid not deny full faith andcredittothe:Ne~l 
Yor!, nss('~sment, since the. New Jersey statute, 'while llom~ 
in ally affecting the remedy only, imposed ttcondHion iinpos-
sible to fulfill as a· prerequisite. of an . actiqn: to .~nfot;ce . ani 
assessment of a sister state and thereforeyiolated the full' 
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution •. In 
concluding that the assessment was as Jlluchentitled tofuU 
faith and credit as if it had been inade bYCQurt order; the 
opinion declared: "The fact that . the assessinent here· in 
question was made under statutory directiollbyan admin. 
istrative officer does not preclude the application of the full 
faith and credit clause. If the assessment had been .made 
in a liquidation proceeding conducted bya court, New Jer· 
sey would have been obliged to enforce it, although the. stock-
holclers sued had not been made parties to the proceedings. 
and, being nonresidents, could not hayc been personally 
:wrved with process. (Oonverse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243. 
252 [32 RCt. 415, 56 L.Ed. 749].) The reason why in that 
case the full faith and credit clause was held to require Wis-
consincourts to enforce the assessment made in Minncsota 
was not because the determination was embop,ied in ajudg-
ment. Against the nonresident stockholders there had been 
no judgment in Minnesota. Wisconsin was required .to eIi-
force the .Minnesota assessment because statutes are 'public 
acts' within the meaning of the elause."The barring6f 
actions in this state before the cause of action ever acc~es 
is certainly as drastic as the condition imposed bythc.Ncw 
Jersey law held invalid in the foregoing case. 
Peters, J. pro tem., concurred. 
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